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Abstract 
Theory of mind (ToM; a.k.a., mind-reading, mentalizing, mental-state attribution, and perspective-
taking) is the ability to ascribe mental states, such as desires and beliefs, to others, and it is central 
to the unique forms of communication, cooperation, and culture that define our species. As a result, 
for forty years, researchers have endeavored to determine whether ToM is itself unique to humans. 
Investigations in other species (e.g., apes, monkeys, corvids) are essential to understand the 
mechanistic underpinnings and evolutionary origins of this capacity across taxa, including humans. 
We review the literature on ToM in nonhuman animals, suggesting that some species share core 
social cognitive mechanisms with humans. We focus principally on innovations of the last decade 
and pressing directions for future work. Underexplored types of social cognition have been targeted, 
including ascription of mental states, like desires and beliefs, that require simultaneously 
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representing one’s own and another’s conflicting motives or views of the world. Ongoing efforts 
probe the motivational facets of ToM, how flexibly animals can recruit social cognitive skills across 
cooperative and competitive settings, and appropriate motivational contexts for comparative 
inquiry. Finally, novel methodological and empirical approaches have brought new species (e.g., 
lemurs, dogs) into the lab, implemented critical controls to elucidate underlying mechanisms, and 
contributed powerful new techniques (e.g., looking-time, eye-tracking) that open the door to 
unexplored approaches for studying animal minds. These innovations in cognition, motivation, and 
method promise fruitful progress in the years to come, in understanding the nature and origin of 
ToM in humans and other species. 
 
Graphical/Visual Abstract and Caption 
 
Caption: Forty years of research has sought to determine whether nonhuman animals, like this 
bonobo, have a theory of mind. 
 
 
Introduction 
 Theory of mind is the ability to ascribe mental states, such as desires and beliefs, to others, 
and it is central to human social life (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Also known as mind-reading or 
mental state attribution, this capacity to infer what others are thinking allows us to interpret, 
predict, and even manipulate others’ behavior. We regularly make use of theory of mind when 
attempting to communicate or to comprehend others’ communication (what did she intend to 
convey?), when competing or cooperating (will my opponent or teammate see me coming?), 
deceiving or helping (what does he want?). Right now, for example, while writing this, we are 
attempting to infer your perspective. We’re imagining what your goals are in reading this paper, 
what background knowledge you might bring to the table, and how we can communicate in ways 
that will be both intelligible and stimulating. We are building theories about the unobservable 
content of your mind, predicated on a theory that other beings have minds in the first place. This 
capacity for mind-reading is central to much of the social and cognitive substrate that makes us 
human, including forms of communication, cooperation, and culture that are believed to set us apart 
from other animals. And consequently, for the last forty years, researchers have sought to 
determine whether theory of mind itself may be unique to our species. 
 
Why study theory of mind in non-human animals? 
There are a number of reasons to study theory of mind in non-human animals, and indeed 
an empirical focus on theory of mind—in humans and non-humans—has roots in animal work. In a 
seminal paper, Premack and Woodruff (1978) coined the term “theory of mind” in order to ask: 
“Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” Today, human theory of mind is a thriving area of 
research in social, cognitive, developmental, and even clinical psychology and increasingly in 
neuroscience and anthropology as well (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 
1985; Barrett et al., 2013; Hare, 2017; Saxe & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, 
& Herrmann, 2012; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), but the study of animal theory of mind has 
not stood still and a growing focus on humans has only elevated the importance of comparisons with 
animals (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Whiten, 2013). Animal cognition work stands to contribute in two 
principal ways to our understanding of the minds of humans and other species—by providing unique 
insights into cognitive mechanisms and evolutionary origins.  
The cognitive architecture of theory of mind is hotly debated. Although we often think of it 
as a single capacity, theory of mind is likely comprised of a suite of interacting mechanisms and the 
nature of those subcomponents and their relationships remains unclear. Many have suggested, for 
example, that theory of mind results from special human cognitive products, like language and 
culture, and that its development is at least partly driven by our unique culture and socialization 
practices (C. M. Heyes & Frith, 2014; Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008; Lohmann & Tomasello, 
2003; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007; Pyers & Senghas, 2009). Thus, demonstrating theory of 
mind capacities in any non-human species would indicate that those capacities can arise and operate 
in the absence of human language and culture. Such findings would suggest that linguistic or cultural 
input simply enhances theory of mind, perhaps through explicit teaching of mental state concepts or 
by expanding the descriptive and recursive nature of the representations one can have of others’ 
minds. We also do not know the extent to which theory of mind depends on or is simply enhanced 
by auxiliary mechanisms like inhibitory control and memory (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Powell 
& Carey, 2017). Finding theory of mind in species with more limited inhibitory control or memory 
than humans would provide some insight toward understanding the minimum requirements for 
theory of mind to emerge.  
Moreover, humans’ closest primate relatives can play a particularly crucial role in identifying 
the cognitive architecture of human theory of mind through elucidation of its evolutionary 
precursors. This process has important implications for understanding the evolutionary origins of 
theory of mind, of course, but also its mechanistic underpinnings (Krupenye, MacLean, & Hare, 2017; 
Krupenye, Rosati, & Hare, 2015). Reconstructing evolutionary history allows us to understand how 
evolution built human social cognition and provides important insight into its constituent 
mechanisms and how they interact in humans. For example, developmental trajectories may mirror 
evolutionary trajectories, with the evolutionarily most ancient mechanisms providing the 
foundation, in development, for the emergence of later-developing human-unique capacities. By 
studying humans’ closest extant relatives, the great apes (family Hominidae; our absolute closest 
being chimpanzees [Pan troglodytes] and bonobos [Pan paniscus], followed by gorillas [Gorilla sp.], 
and then orangutans [Pongo sp.]), we can discriminate mechanisms that are unique to humans from 
those that were already present in our common ancestor (i.e., those that are shared with at least 
chimpanzees and bonobos). Apes are not monkeys but they are part of a broader phylogenetic 
group called Catarrhini that also includes the monkeys of Africa and Asia (Old World Monkeys; family 
Cercopithicidae). By looking beyond apes to Old World monkeys, we can determine which aspects of 
ape theory of mind evolved earliest and are also shared with monkeys, and which evolved later and 
are only present in apes. This information allows us to reconstruct the cognitive phenotype of our 
common ancestors at different points in our evolutionary history, clarifying which mechanisms are 
most basal and which build on one another. It also allows us to identify the building blocks that were 
already present 6-9 million years ago at the start of humans’ unique evolutionary trajectory and to 
speculate about the events that must have subsequently occurred for our unique mechanisms to 
evolve. Demonstrating theory of mind in our closest ape relatives, for example, would suggest that 
uniquely human language and cultural capacities were built on evolutionarily ancient social 
cognition—rather than language or culture providing the foundation for theory of mind. 
Broader phylogenetic comparisons can tell us whether the mechanisms involved in theory of 
mind also evolved convergently (i.e., independently) in distantly related species (e.g., in corvids, like 
crows, ravens, and jays) (Emery & Clayton, 2004). If social cognitive mechanisms are adaptations to a 
species’ social or physical ecology, these comparisons can shed light on the selective pressures that 
drove their evolution as well (MacLean et al., 2012). For example, the social intelligence hypothesis 
proposes that social cognition evolved in response to the demands of social living (e.g., competing 
with groupmates for reproductive opportunities) (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Dunbar & Shultz, 2007; 
Humphrey, 1976; Jolly, 1966). According to this hypothesis, phylogenetic comparisons should reveal 
that species that inhabit the most socially complex groups have evolved more sophisticated social 
cognitive abilities than those that face fewer social challenges. Other hypotheses postulate that 
features of the physical environment, like feeding ecology, place different cognitive demands on 
animals and predict that more sophisticated abilities will have evolved in species that rely on fruits 
rather than leaves or that must exploit otherwise inaccessible resources through tool-use and 
extractive foraging (Milton, 1981, 1988; Reader & Laland, 2002; Rosati, 2017). Finally, comparisons 
of key closely related species, such as between domesticates and their wild counterparts, can also 
clarify how known evolutionary pressures, like artificial selection (i.e., selective breeding) against 
aggression during domestication, shape cognition (Hare, 2017; Hare, Brown, Williamson, & 
Tomasello, 2002; Hare, Wobber, & Wrangham, 2012; Krupenye, MacLean, et al., 2017). By 
manipulating or controlling for socialization—for example, intensive versus minimal interaction with 
humans—these studies can additionally disentangle environmental and genetic effects on cognitive 
and behavioral development. Thus, studies of animal theory of mind are critical to understand both 
the mechanistic underpinnings and the evolutionary origins of these abilities in humans.  
 
State of the art 10 years back 
In 2008, Call and Tomasello (2008) revisited the question that launched theory of mind 
research three decades earlier: “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978). Only 10 years before, there had been considerable consensus from the 
experimental literature that theory of mind may be unique to humans—despite anecdotal evidence 
that wild animals engaged in behaviors like deception that could be underlain by theory of mind 
(Anderson, Montant, & Schmitt, 1996; Byrne & Whiten, 1988; D. Cheney & R. Seyfarth, 1990; de 
Waal, 1982; C. Heyes, 1998; Kummer, Anzenberger, & Hemelrijk, 1996; Povinelli & Eddy, 1996b; 
Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen, 1990; Povinelli, Parks, & Novak, 1991; Povinelli, Rulf, & Bierschwale, 
1994; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Whiten & Byrne, 1988). By 2008, Call and Tomasello (2008) concluded 
that things had changed: several tasks provided converging evidence that apes were sensitive to the 
goals and intentions that underlie others’ actions. For example, they were more patient with an 
individual who intended to feed them but was unable to do so than with one who was unwilling to 
share food, they discriminated and responded appropriately to intentional versus accidental actions, 
they helped others achieve their goals, and they completed others’ failed actions (Buttelmann, 
Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Buttelmann, Schütte, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2012; Call, 
Hare, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2004; Call & Tomasello, 1998; Krupenye, Tan, & Hare, 2018; Myowa-
Yamakoshi & Matsuzawa, 2000; Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005; Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & 
Tomasello, 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; Yamamoto, Humle, & Tanaka, 2012). There was also 
a variety of evidence suggesting that apes were aware of what others could see, and perhaps hear, 
and what others knew on the basis of seeing. For example, apes followed others’ gaze around 
barriers and checked back with the actor if they could not find the target of her attention (Brauer, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Call, Hare, & Tomasello, 1998; Okamoto, Tanaka, & Tomonaga, 2004; 
Okamoto-Barth, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Povinelli & Eddy, 1996a; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 1998; 
Tomasello, Hare, & Agnetta, 1999; Tomasello, Hare, & Fogleman, 2001; Tomasello, Hare, Lehmann, 
& Call, 2007). They relied on visual gestural communication more when a recipient was oriented 
toward them than away and would even move to the front of the recipient before beginning to 
gesture (Gómez, 1996; Hostetter, Cantero, & Hopkins, 2001; Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2004; 
Leavens, Hostetter, Wesley, & Hopkins, 2004; Liebal, Call, Tomasello, & Pika, 2004; Povinelli & Eddy, 
1996b; Povinelli, Theall, Reaux, & Dunphy-Lelii, 2003; Tomasello, Call, Nagell, Olguin, & Carpenter, 
1994). And, in competitive tasks, chimpanzees concealed their approach and preferentially targeted 
food that a competitor could not see or was ignorant about (Brauer, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Hare, 
Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001, 2006; Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 
2008; Karg, Schmelz, Call, & Tomasello, 2015a; Melis, Call, & Tomasello, 2006). These studies 
suggested that apes may have a non-egocentric view of the world—that they could recognize and 
exploit the ways in which their perceptual access may differ from others. However, a few studies 
failed to find evidence that apes could go beyond understanding of others’ knowledge or ignorance 
to represent their beliefs. In several experiments, a competitor or cooperator watched an object be 
hidden in one location but was absent while it was moved. Although apes could witness the entire 
baiting and track their partner’s attention, they did not take advantage of the fact that their 
competitor or cooperator would falsely believe that the object was still in the location where she 
had last seen it (Call & Tomasello, 1999; Hare et al., 2001; Kaminski et al., 2008; Krachun, Carpenter, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2009, 2010). Taken together, this work suggested that apes were able to track the 
goals, perceptions, and knowledge that motivate others’ actions but that they could not represent 
what others believed (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Hare, 2011). Related work suggested that monkeys 
(rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta; capuchin monkeys, Sapajus apella/Cebus apella) were also 
sensitive to others’ goals and intentions and that both monkeys (rhesus macaques) and corvids 
(common ravens, Corvus corax; California scrub-jays, Aphelocoma californica; Eurasian jays, Garrulus 
glandarius; jackdaws, Coloeus monedula; Clark’s nutcracker, Nucifraga columbiana) were sensitive 
to others’ visual and auditory perspectives (Anderson, Kuroshima, Takimoto, & Fujita, 2013; 
Bugnyar, 2011; Bugnyar & Heinrich, 2005; Bugnyar & Kotrschal, 2002; Bugnyar, Stowe, & Heinrich, 
2004; Clary & Kelly, 2011; Dally, Emery, & Clayton, 2004, 2005, 2006; Drayton & Santos, 2014a; 
Emery & Clayton, 2001; Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Hare, Addessi, Call, Tomasello, & Visalberghi, 
2003; Legg & Clayton, 2014; Legg, Ostojić, & Clayton, 2016; Phillips, Barnes, Mahajan, Yamaguchi, & 
Santos, 2009; Rochat, Serra, Fadiga, & Gallese, 2008; Santos, Nissen, & Ferrugia, 2006; Shaw & 
Clayton, 2013; Tornick, Rushia, & Gibson, 2016; von Bayern & Emery, 2009).  
Skeptics suggested—and hold to this day—that no particular study has provided unequivocal 
evidence of animal theory of mind, since in most cases subjects had access to some behavioral 
information that they could use to predict others’ actions (C. Heyes, 1998, 2015; Penn & Povinelli, 
2007; Povinelli & Vonk, 2003) (but see Halina, 2015 for an argument against this so-called "logical 
problem"). As one example, during the course of an animal’s life, she may have learned that agents 
tend to pursue desirable objects that are in front of them, within their “line of gaze.” Consequently, 
in experiments where such information is available, she could expect agents to pursue objects they 
can see based on physical relationships between those agents and objects, without representing 
that the agents can actually see the objects. But, for many, the convergence of findings across a 
great many paradigms—coupled with experimental manipulations to control for individual 
explanations (see Hare, 2011 Table 1)—suggested that a common mind-reading mechanism may 
provide a more parsimonious explanation than the diverse suite of behavior rules that would be 
necessary to explain successful performance across tasks (Call & Tomasello, 2008). 
 
Focus 
 In the remainder of the present article, we review advances of the last decade and discuss 
what we see as the most pressing avenues for future work. These current and future directions are 
organized around three interlinked themes. In the Cognition section, we address the types of mental 
state attribution being investigated in theory of mind tasks and, to some extent, the representations 
underlying them. In the Motivation section, we address the motivational substrate involved in 
experimental tests for theory of mind. And, finally, in the Methods section, we detail novel 
methodologies and empirical approaches that are moving the field forward. In the sections that 
follow, we will address new tests and controls aimed at distinguishing alternative explanations of 
observed behavior. However, the present paper endeavors principally to highlight advances and 
future directions in theory of mind research, rather than to confront alternative explanations (for 
papers with this latter goal, see Hare, 2011; Martin & Santos, 2016). Accordingly, the question of 
interpretation will arise periodically throughout the paper and we will, for example, review new 
efforts to refute particular alternatives. However, we will also often discuss “sensitivity” to particular 
mental states without making strong claims about the underlying mechanisms that permit animals 
to respond appropriately to them. In many cases, as we will discuss, elucidating these mechanisms 
requires further empirical and philosophical scrutiny. 
 
COGNITION 
Until recently, research on animal theory of mind has focused largely on two classes of 
abilities. First, work on animals’ understanding of conative or motivational states has concentrated 
on the ability to identify others’ goals and intentions. In the last decade, researchers have begun to 
push the boundaries of animals’ understanding by investigating whether they grasp the transience 
and subjectivity of these motivational states. Specifically, they have tested whether animals can 
attribute context-induced preferences (e.g., understanding that an actor will prefer food A over food 
B because the actor has already become sated on food B) and whether they know that others’ 
desires and preferences may differ from, and even conflict with, their own.  
Second, work on understanding of cognitive or epistemic states has investigated whether 
animals are aware of what others can perceive or have perceived (e.g., what others can or cannot 
see, or what they know or remain ignorant about)—what is called level I perspective-taking. More 
recently, research has made ground in clarifying whether any animals recognize that others are 
acting not just based on awareness or lack of awareness of reality but instead based on beliefs about 
the world (including beliefs that are false). Although still at a nascent stage, this work is also 
increasingly opening directions for investigating level II perspective-taking (understanding how 
something appears from another’s perspective). These parallel lines of inquiry—into attribution of 
subjective desires and of false beliefs—are particularly crucial because both types of mentalizing 
require, by definition, awareness of a self-other distinction and, specifically, the capacity to 
recognize and represent the ways in which others’ motives and views differ from one’s own. 
 
Desires 
Understanding that others’ minds and mental states differ from one’s own is central to 
theory of mind. In human development, an early milestone of this sort is the emerging recognition 
that desires are subjective. By 9 months, human infants appear to comprehend that preferences are 
specific to individuals—infants do not generalize one agent’s preference to a second novel agent 
(Buresh & Woodward, 2007; Henderson & Woodward, 2012)—and around 18 months they know 
that individuals can even have desires and preferences that conflict with the child’s own (Repacholi 
& Gopnik, 1997; but see Ruffman, Aitken, Wilson, Puri, & Taumoepeau, 2018). Substantial work on 
animals’ understanding of others’ motivational states suggests that some species can infer the goals 
and intentions that underlie others’ actions, but, until recently, it has been unclear whether they 
treat preferences and desires as subjective and, specifically, whether they are aware that others may 
hold desires that conflict with the participant’s own (Buttelmann, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Kano & 
Call, 2014b; Rochat et al., 2008).  
 Ostojić, Shaw, Cheke, and Clayton (2013) developed an ingenious method for investigating 
desire-state attribution in Eurasian jays by capitalizing on their natural food-sharing behavior (Legg, 
Ostojić, & Clayton, 2015; Ostojić, Cheke, Shaw, Legg, & Clayton, 2016) (Figure 1). During the mating 
season, males provision females, leading the researchers to wonder whether the males were taking 
into account what the females wanted. In their first experiment, the researchers established that 
desires can be manipulated through specific satiety—that jays could be sated on one food, reducing 
their desire for that food, while still being hungry for other foods. Males or females were pre-fed 
one of two types of larvae and were then allowed to eat both types. To assess the impact of pre-
feeding on jays’ relative preferences for food A versus food B, their choices in each condition were 
compared with baseline preferences (from a baseline condition in which they were only pre-fed 
their maintenance diet) and then compared between test conditions (pre-fed food A versus pre-fed 
food B). Jays who were pre-fed food A showed a greater shift from baseline preferences toward a 
relative preference for food B than did jays who were pre-fed food B. That is, when jays became 
specifically sated on one food, they decreased their desire for that food while their desire for the 
other remained constant. In the desire-understanding sharing experiment, males watched as 
females were pre-fed one of the two types of larvae (i.e., her desire for one food was reduced by 
pre-feeding while her desire for the non-pre-fed food remained constant), while males themselves 
were pre-fed maintenance diet (i.e., males’ desires were not manipulated; Figure 1A). Then males 
could choose to share either type of larvae with the female (Figure 1B and 1C). Subjects shifted their 
choice of food flexibly depending on what the female had been pre-fed—increasing their choice of 
foods that she still desired. In a control condition in which males could not witness their partner pre-
feeding, sharing behavior differed significantly from the test condition, indicating that, at the time of 
test, jays were not simply responding to behavioral cues from the female about what she wanted. 
Having observed her pre-feeding was necessary to appropriately respond to her desires. 
 
 
Figure 1. Desire attribution experiments with Eurasian jays. (a) A female was sated on one type of 
food, decreasing her desire for that food relative to others, while her male partner watched. (b) 
Males could then choose between the sated (undesired) food and a desired alternative. (c) Males 
shifted their choice of foods to share with the female depending on what she still wanted. Copyright: 
Ljerka Ostojić and Lovre Čulina. 
 
 In these studies, males’ desires differed from females’ in that males were sated on neither 
food (i.e., females desired a single food while males desired both). However, an important question 
is whether jays can also respond appropriately to desires that directly conflict with their own. To 
tackle this question, Ostojić et al. (2014) pre-fed both males and females the same or different foods 
so that they would have matched or mismatched desire states. When their states were matched, 
males delivered the desired food to their partners. When their states were mismatched, males 
showed an intermediate response, suggesting that their sharing behavior was biased by their own 
desire but that they still took their partner’s desire into account. 
 Another key question is whether jays’ sensitivity to desires is specific to the cooperative 
food-sharing context or whether it might extend flexibly to other social settings. To address this 
question, Ostojić et al. (2017) investigated whether Eurasian jays and California scrub-jays would 
take an observer’s desires into account in a caching context in which they could potentially cache 
undesired food to avoid it being pilfered by the observer. Cachers watched as observers were pre-
fed one of two types of food and, indeed, showed increased tendencies to cache the food that the 
observer did not desire. However, this caching strategy persisted in another condition in which 
cachers could not witness the observer’s pre-feeding. These experiments indicate that jays are 
sensitive to others’ desires in diverse contexts, but that they may deploy different mechanisms in 
each setting. The observer’s behavior at the time of caching was sufficient to shift the cacher’s 
strategy, whereas, in the food-sharing context, the partner’s behavior at the time of sharing was not 
sufficient; jays needed to witness the pre-feeding in order to show sensitivity to their partner’s 
desire. This body of work suggests that some nonhuman species are sensitive to internal states that 
differ from their own and that an understanding of subjective desires may have evolved 
convergently in humans and jays. Whether this ability is shared with primates or other species 
remains a key question for future work. 
 
Beliefs 
 False beliefs are epistemic states that conflict with reality (e.g., believing that there are 
cookies in the cabinet, when in fact your sibling has already eaten them). Understanding others’ 
false beliefs has long been seen as the defining signature of a “full-blown” theory of mind (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985; Dennett, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1978; Wellman et al., 2001). This is the case because 
attributing false beliefs requires simultaneously representing two conflicting views of the world—
one’s own, which aligns with reality, and that of another, which does not. Previous work suggested 
that apes, monkeys, and corvids were sensitive to others’ knowledge and ignorance but not their 
beliefs. Attributing false beliefs is similar to attributing ignorance in that both require a non-
egocentric view of the world in which an animal distinguishes between the information it has about 
the world and that which is possessed by another agent. However, they differ, critically, in that one 
can attribute ignorance by representing a single view of the world (reality) and recognizing that 
another agent simply has incomplete access to it (e.g., that the agent has not seen an object be 
hidden under a box and therefore has no awareness that there is or isn’t an object under the box). In 
contrast, to attribute false beliefs, one must represent two distinct views of the world—one’s own 
(which corresponds to reality) and the mutually incompatible view of another (e.g., you believe that 
an object is under a box, where you have last seen it, but I know that it is no longer there). As such, 
in its richest forms, false belief understanding relies not only on attributions of whether or not an 
agent has perceived an object (level I perspective-taking), but also of how the situation appears from 
the agent’s perspective—including how this appearance may differ from one’s own perspective 
(level II perspective-taking) (Flavel, Everett, Croft, & Flavel, 1981). It is this meta-representational 
capacity that is thought to be at the heart of human communication, cooperation, and culture.  
 A handful of previous studies failed to find evidence of false belief understanding in apes in 
interactive social contexts involving food (Call & Tomasello, 1999; Hare et al., 2001; Kaminski et al., 
2008; Krachun et al., 2009, 2010), possibly because they overtaxed apes’ inhibitory control and 
memory capacities (see “Methods: Novel Techniques” section for further discussion). Indeed, 
children also fail a variety of false belief tasks until age 4—perhaps owing in part to overwhelming 
cognitive demands, since even infants can pass tasks specifically designed to minimize these 
demands (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Scott & Baillargeon, 2017; Wellman et al., 2001).  
 In traditional false belief tasks, a participant watches as one actor sees an object hidden in 
one of two locations and then leaves the scene. While away, the object is moved or removed, and, 
when the actor returns, the participant is asked where the actor will search for the object. If 
participants understand that the actor has a false belief, they should indicate that he will search for 
the object in the location where he last saw it hidden. To implement this traditional design under 
minimal task demands, developmental psychologists identified nonverbal measures of action 
prediction (Clements & Perner, 1994; Onishi & Bailargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007). 
For example, anticipatory looking methods exploit participants’ tendency to look to locations where 
they expect an event to imminently occur (Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Kano & Call, 2014b; Kano & 
Hirata, 2015; Lorincz et al., 2005). Participants watch videos of traditional false belief events, while 
their gaze direction is non-invasively recorded with an infrared eye-tracker positioned beneath the 
monitor. In the final scenes of the video, as an actor ambiguously approaches two locations to 
search for a hidden object, human infants look to the location where the actor falsely believes the 
object is hidden—anticipating the actor’s search (Schneider, Bayliss, Becker, & Dux, 2012; Senju, 
Southgate, Snape, Leonard, & Csibra, 2011; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009; Southgate et al., 
2007; Surian & Geraci, 2012).   
 Capitalizing on these innovations, Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, and Tomasello (2016) 
developed a pair of eye-tracking false belief experiments for chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans 
(Figure 2). To motivate apes to attend to an actor’s false belief, the researchers contextualized 
traditional false belief scenarios within social dramas that were specifically designed to maximize 
apes’ interest. For example, in one study, a human actor engaged in an agonistic conflict with a 
costumed gorilla (Figure 3). The actor then attempted to search for the gorilla, who had originally 
hidden in one of two locations while the actor was watching but later fled the scene while the actor 
was away. Across two studies, apes attended closely to the social events, and then looked in 
anticipation of the actor searching where he falsely believed the gorilla (or other goal object) to be—
even though apes themselves knew that it was no longer there. This study provided the first 
evidence that apes may be sensitive not just to others’ knowledge or ignorance but also to their 
beliefs (Table 1).  
 
 
Figure 2. Eye-tracking setup. An infrared eye-tracker non-invasively records an orangutan’s gaze as 
she attends to pictures and videos presented on a monitor, just outside of her enclosure. A nearby 
laptop controls stimuli presentation. Subjects voluntarily approach the setup to view the stimuli and 
sip a slow stream of juice. Copyright: Christopher Krupenye and Leipzig Zoo. 
 
 Figure 3. False belief tests with great apes. Apes’ gaze is recorded as they witness an actor chase a 
costumed gorilla into a hiding place on the right (A), and watch as the gorilla moves to a second 
location on the left (B). The actor then leaves through a door (C), and, while away, the gorilla flees 
the scene (D). The actor returns, falsely believing that the gorilla is still on the left. As he approaches 
centrally toward the two locations (E), apes’ looks in advance of his search are automatically coded 
based on pre-determined areas-of-interest (F). Apes look in anticipation of the actor searching for 
the gorilla on the left, where the actor falsely believes the gorilla to be.  
 
  Paired conditions within each of the studies controlled for low-level explanations—apes 
could not succeed by looking to the first or last location of the goal object or the last location the 
actor attended (Southgate et al., 2007) (Table 1). Apes closely tracked all events, making it clear that 
they had not simply overlooked the object’s movement (C. Heyes, 2014a). Moreover, they could not 
have solved the task by attributing ignorance to the actor rather than a false belief. Apes did not 
expect the actor to err or exhibit uncertainty (Baillargeon et al., 2010); they specifically anticipated 
that he would search for his goal where he falsely believed it to be. Applying an interpretation 
previously offered for human adults and infants (C. Heyes, 2014a, 2014b), C. Heyes (2017) suggested 
that apes may have been submentalizing: predicting behavior via domain-general psychological 
processes, including several low-level cueing effects. C. Heyes (2017) recommended that studies test 
for submentalizing with inanimate controls—stimuli matched for low-level perceptual cues but 
devoid of social or agentic features. If participants show comparable levels of attention, 
submentalizing predicts that domain-general processes will elicit common patterns of anticipatory 
looking, even in inanimate controls. Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, and Tomasello (2017) implemented 
Heyes’s proposed control, and found no evidence that submentalizing could explain the findings 
from their false belief test (Kano, Krupenye, Hirata, Call, & Tomasello, 2017). These results suggest 
that apes’ ability to predict the behavior of an agent with a false belief is, at the very least, based on 
a rich understanding of social cues. It remains an open question, however, whether apes were fully 
representing the actor’s beliefs (the mentalist account), tracking what Butterfill and Apperly (2013) 
call belief-like states (the minimalist account; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), or relying on a 
sophisticated rule learned during their lives that agents tend to search for things where they last saw 
them (the behavior rule account; Perner & Ruffman, 2005) (see Table 1 for more detail).  
  Given apes’ previous failures in various interactive false belief tasks (Call & Tomasello, 1999; 
Hare et al., 2001; Kaminski et al., 2008; Krachun et al., 2009, 2010), another important question is 
whether or how their sensitivity to others’ beliefs contributes to decision-making. Buttelmann, 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello (2017) tested apes in an active helping paradigm in 
which a human actor placed an object in one of two boxes. The object was then moved to the other 
box while the actor was present (true belief condition) or absent (false belief condition) and, finally, 
both boxes were locked. In both conditions, the actor then returned and attempted to open the box 
that originally contained the object (which was now empty) and pushed both boxes forward, 
allowing the subject to unlock one. In the false belief condition, apes instead unlocked the other box, 
which now contained the object. The mentalist account would suggest that they recognized that the 
actor was still pursuing the object but had sought it in its original location because he had not 
witnessed its transfer. In the true belief condition, they unlocked the two boxes at chance level. They 
knew that the actor knew about the object’s new location, so unlocked the box containing the object 
significantly less than in the false belief condition, but their chance performance may reflect some 
uncertainty about whether the actor could have really wanted to open an empty box. These findings 
suggest that apes’ sensitivity to beliefs can indeed translate into action.  
 Is sensitivity to beliefs restricted to apes? Marticorena, Ruiz, Mukerji, Goddu, and Santos 
(2011) tested free-ranging rhesus macaques in a violation-of-expectation task (Onishi & Bailargeon, 
2005). Monkeys watched an actor, with a true or false belief about an object’s location, search for 
that object in the correct or incorrect hiding place. Monkeys looked longer when the actor with a 
true belief searched in the incorrect location than in the correct location, suggesting that they 
expected the knowledgeable actor to find the object. In contrast, they looked equally long when the 
actor with the false belief searched in the correct and incorrect locations, suggesting that they did 
not have clear expectations about what that actor would do. A second looking time study also found 
no evidence that macaques were sensitive to others’ beliefs (Martin & Santos, 2014, 2016). These 
results are consistent with those from a pioneering anticipatory looking experiment on a single 
macaque (Lorincz et al., 2005), although that experiment employed different methods than those 
used by Krupenye et al. (2016). Taken together, these studies raise the possibility that the 
mechanisms underlying apes’ sensitivity to others’ beliefs may have evolved uniquely in the ape 
lineage. However, to further test this hypothesis, it will be important to investigate monkeys’ 
sensitivity in the sorts of paradigms in which apes have excelled. 
 
Future Directions 
Despite these advances, a number of outstanding questions remain. To date, evidence for 
sensitivity to subjective desires is limited to jays and sensitivity to beliefs is restricted to apes. Future 
work should investigate the extent to which these abilities are shared with other species, through 
homology or convergence, and whether shared capacities reflect common or only superficially 
similar cognitive mechanisms.  
In jays, it would also be interesting to know which cues of specific satiety provide sufficient 
information to permit sensitivity to desires. Moreover, results from different contexts suggested 
that, in caching but not food-sharing, jays may be able to rely on a partner’s behavior alone. It thus 
remains unclear whether jays employ entirely separate mechanisms in these different contexts or 
whether their social cognitive toolkit is comprised of interlinked behavior-reading and mind-reading 
mechanisms that are flexibly deployed, as necessary, across contexts. Finally, since these birds have, 
in different paradigms, shown sensitivity to desires as well as visual perspective (Legg & Clayton, 
2014; Legg et al., 2016; Ostojić et al., 2017; Ostojić et al., 2014; Ostojić et al., 2013), a key question is 
whether they can integrate these two types of social information to maximize their behavioral 
strategies. Do jays adjust their behavior flexibly on the basis of a robust and unified understanding of 
others’ interacting mental states or are they relying on domain-specific strategies that trump one 
another in particular contexts?  
 The question of whether apes can represent others’ beliefs in the same way as humans is 
also unresolved. Future work should focus on the development of tasks for which the mentalist, 
minimalist, and behavior rule accounts offer differing predictions. Change-of-location tasks (where 
an individual has a false belief because a goal object has changed locations since the individual last 
saw it), like those used by Krupenye et al. (2016), are the most commonly employed false belief 
manipulations. However, all three accounts predict success in such tasks (Table 1). Thus, it will be 
critical to explore other paradigms, like those involving false beliefs about identity or false 
perceptions (Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Scott, Richman, & Baillargeon, 2015; Song & Baillargeon, 
2008), which offer the potential to discriminate these hypotheses and may even necessitate level II 
perspective-taking. 
 Another important direction involves further investigating how false belief inferences 
translate into behavioral strategies. That is, in which active contexts beyond the helping interactions 
examined by Buttelmann et al. (2017) will apes show evidence of sensitivity to beliefs? Paramount in 
this effort will be developing naturalistic paradigms that minimize task demands. For example, apes’ 
fixation on food is likely both distracting and taxing on their inhibitory control abilities. Thus, it may 
not be insignificant that food was central to all false belief tasks that apes previously failed (Call & 
Tomasello, 1999; Hare et al., 2001; Kaminski et al., 2008; Krachun et al., 2009, 2010) but was absent 
from all those that they passed (Buttelmann et al., 2017; Krupenye et al., 2016).  
 Advances in animals’ sensitivity to others’ knowledge and beliefs have also opened up 
questions about how they represent ignorance. Martin and Santos (2016) have suggested that truly 
understanding others’ ignorance may require the kind of representational architecture involved in 
understanding others’ beliefs—since ignorance, like a false belief, is a mental state that is in some 
ways decoupled from reality. In many tasks, animals respond differently to actors who are 
knowledgeable versus ignorant. However, it remains unclear whether they do so by ascribing 
knowledge to one individual and ignorance to the other, or by only making ascriptions to the 
knowledgeable individual (Martin & Santos, 2016). Thus, an important question for future work is 
what animals really know about others’ ignorance and whether they make specific predictions about 
how ignorant individuals will behave.  
 Finally, the extent to which animals can combine mental state inferences with other 
inferential abilities and with information about physical entities remains little understood. For 
example, Eckert, Rakoczy, Call, Herrmann, and Hanus (2018) tested whether chimpanzees could 
integrate information about agents with statistical reasoning inferences. Chimpanzees could choose 
from which of two populations to receive a sample of food—one with a majority of preferred food 
and one with a majority of non-preferred food—each from a different experimenter. In some cases, 
experimenters had biases to deliver one food over the other, independent of proportions within the 
population. Chimpanzees flexibly integrated social information with statistical inferences: they chose 
based on proportional information when they lacked information about the experimenter’s biases or 
when the experimenter did not have visual access to the food while sampling, but chose based on 
experimenter biases when experimenters did have visual access. Future work should continue to 
examine how flexibly animals can integrate inferences about agents with other inferential or 
reasoning abilities and with information about the physical constraints of the situation. 
 
MOTIVATION 
 Motivation is another key aspect of social cognition and it is central to the development of 
effective social cognitive tasks. Many of the best experiments are those that elegantly mimic natural 
circumstances—that challenge animals with the sorts of problems that selection built their cognition 
to solve (e.g., D. L. Cheney & R. M. Seyfarth, 1990; Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). Such tasks can be 
considered to have a high degree of ecological validity (Hare, 2001). The strength of ecologically 
valid tasks derives from the generalizability of their results to natural contexts but also, importantly, 
from their ability to motivate subjects to participate—and to put their cognitive skills to use. 
Although more artificial tasks can probe the flexibility of cognition, these tasks risk failing to detect 
cognition in the first place if they cannot elicit sufficient motivation from participants. One of the 
chief advances of the last decade, and an important continued direction, is an effort to determine 
the breadth of contexts in which animals are motivated to utilize theory of mind. This work clarifies 
how flexibly animals can employ their social cognitive skill, and also the range of social and 
ecological challenges that may be responsible for its evolution. 
 Many of the earliest studies on primate theory of mind involved object-choice tasks: 
subjects could choose to search for food under one of several containers and, although the subjects 
had not witnessed the baiting, they could rely on cooperative-communicative cues from 
knowledgeable and ignorant human experimenters who pointed to different cups (Call & Santos, 
2012; Krupenye, 2017). Researchers reasoned that, if animals could infer that the experimenter who 
witnessed the baiting knew where the food was hidden while the other did not, they should follow 
the communicative cues of the knowledgeable experimenter to find the hidden food. Primates 
tended to fail these sorts of tasks (Itakura, Agnetta, Hare, & Tomasello, 1999; Povinelli & Eddy, 
1996b; Povinelli et al., 1990; Povinelli et al., 1991; Povinelli et al., 1994), which contributed to the 
prevailing assessment at the time that theory of mind might be unique to humans (C. Heyes, 1998; 
Tomasello & Call, 1997). However, Tomasello, Call, and Hare (2003) later suggested that primates’ 
failure in these tasks may have reflected a lack of ecological validity rather than a lack of theory of 
mind. It may simply be that primates do not use communicative cues like pointing cooperatively, and 
thus they are unable to understand such cues in cooperative contexts. 
 Hare (2001) proposed that focusing instead on competitive contexts could yield more 
promise, since primates likely rely on their social cognitive abilities for competition and, 
consequently, should be highly motivated to use these skills in competitive contexts. And, indeed, it 
was in competitive contexts that many of the first theory of mind skills were demonstrated in 
primates and corvids (Bugnyar & Kotrschal, 2002; Emery & Clayton, 2001; Flombaum & Santos, 
2005; Hare et al., 2000; Hare et al., 2001). The success of competitive paradigms canalized research 
in that direction and even led some to offer that primate social cognition may be specific to the 
competitive domain (Lyons & Santos, 2006). 
 A key development in theory of mind research has been a recent effort to understand 
whether animals also use their social cognitive abilities outside of competitive contexts. Schmelz and 
Call (2016) have called, in particular, for increasing work on theory of mind in cooperative contexts—
where a variety of social strategies have been documented (de Waal, 1982; Melis, Hare, & 
Tomasello, 2006; Tan & Hare, 2013; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; Watts & Mitani, 2001).  
As discussed above, work with Eurasian jays suggests that they are sensitive to others’ 
desires in both competitive and cooperative contexts (Ostojić et al., 2017; Ostojić et al., 2014; 
Ostojić et al., 2013). Chimpanzees have been shown to provide help based on an understanding of 
others’ goals, even as part of a collaborative task requiring sensitivity to the different roles they and 
a partner must play to reach a common goal (Melis & Tomasello, 2013; Warneken et al., 2007; 
Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; Yamamoto, Humle, & Tanaka, 2009; Yamamoto et al., 2012). Recent 
evidence also suggests that apes, rhesus macaques, dogs (Canis lupus familiaris), and ravens are 
sensitive to others’ perspectives in cooperative contexts as well as neutral ones (Bugnyar, 2011; 
Bugnyar & Heinrich, 2005; Buttelmann et al., 2017; Catala, Mang, Wallis, & Huber, 2017; Drayton & 
Santos, 2017, 2018; Grueneisen, Duguid, Saur, & Tomasello, 2017; Kaminski, Brauer, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2009; Karg et al., 2015a; Krupenye et al., 2016; MacLean & Hare, 2012; MacLean, 
Krupenye, & Hare, 2014; Maginnity & Grace, 2014; Marticorena et al., 2011). In the wild, 
chimpanzees even appear to selectively inform ignorant groupmates of nearby snakes more than 
knowledgeable ones (Crockford, Wittig, Mundry, & Zuberbuhler, 2012; Crockford, Wittig, & 
Zuberbuhler, 2017). These studies suggest that many species are able to flexibly use their social 
cognitive abilities across competitive and cooperative settings.   
 
Future Directions 
 Future work should continue to explore theory of mind in cooperative contexts. Perhaps 
most critically, Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, and Moll (2005) have proposed that shared 
intentionality, the capacity to structure cooperative activities around shared goals, is the defining 
difference between human and nonhuman cognition at the heart of our cultural minds. Thus, it will 
be imperative to further clarify the extent to which the motivational and cognitive underpinnings of 
this ability are unique to humans (Melis & Tomasello, 2013).  
 Motivation must also be considered for investigating understudied species, particularly from 
a comparative perspective. To elucidate the differences between species, it is important to employ a 
dual approach. For example, despite being humans’ other closest relative, bonobos have received 
vastly less empirical attention—particularly with regard to theory of mind research—than have 
chimpanzees. Understanding the nuanced differences between bonobos and chimpanzees will 
require testing bonobos in a combination of validated tasks that have provided positive evidence of 
chimpanzee theory of mind as well as novel tasks that are specifically designed to maximize 
motivation and ecological validity for bonobos (Krupenye, MacLean, et al., 2017). Existing tasks are 
appealing—and important—because they have been validated with one or more species and they 
permit direct empirical comparisons with these species; however, they have often been designed 
with a particular species in mind and may thus disadvantage other taxa for which the task context is 
less motivating or intuitive. Chimpanzee tasks have largely focused on competitive contexts, which 
may be more stressful and less motivating for bonobos (Wobber, Hare, et al., 2010), and, therefore, 
such tasks can only reveal the niceties of ape theory of mind in concert with those designed 
specifically for bonobos (Krupenye, MacLean, et al., 2017; Krupenye et al., 2018). 
 Finally, we advocate for the development of tasks in which animals are motivated by 
rewards other than food. For example, social events have major consequences for group-living 
animals, such as primates and corvids, and consequently these species have become attuned to 
third-party interactions (Anderson et al., 2013; Bergman, Beehner, Cheney, & Seyfarth, 2003; 
Herrmann, Keupp, Hare, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2013; Krupenye & Hare, 2018; Massen, Pasukonis, 
Schmidt, & Bugnyar, 2014; Paz-y-Miño, Bond, Kamil, & Balda, 2004; Russell, Call, & Dunbar, 2008; 
Subiaul, Vonk, Okamoto-Barth, & Barth, 2008; Wittig, Crockford, Langergraber, & Zuberbuhler, 
2014). Thus, for many taxa, dramatic third-party social events, such as agonistic or mating 
interactions, may offer a highly motivating context in which to embed particular kinds of theory of 
mind tasks. In this way, social information itself can serve as an ecologically valid motivation, rather 
than potentially distracting food rewards. This has already proven effective in recently successful 
false belief tests with apes in which information about an actor’s false belief was contextualized 
within engaging third-party conflicts (Krupenye et al., 2016) as well as in tests of third-party 
knowledge itself (D. L. Cheney & R. M. Seyfarth, 1990; Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). Third-party social 
contexts likely will continue to be fruitful for the development of other tasks of a related nature, and 
recent evidence suggesting that some species may flexibly attribute agency beyond social partners 
(and predators and prey) to animated agents (Krupenye & Hare, 2018) means that both controlled 
live-action and animated stimuli may be suitable for future investigations. 
 
METHODS 
 Advances in methodological and empirical approaches have been paramount to the 
discoveries of the past decade. In particular, during this period there has been inclusion of novel 
species, novel controls, novel techniques, and novel experimental settings. 
 
Novel Species 
Most social cognition research has focused on primates and corvids but testing a broader 
range of species is essential to understand the phylogenetic distribution of social cognition. As 
discussed earlier, this phylogenetic approach contributes to our understanding of both the 
mechanisms and evolution of theory of mind. The last decade has seen expansion of social cognitive 
research to include several key taxa, including lemurs and dogs. 
Within primates, strepsirrhines—including lemurs, galagos, and lorises—are our most 
distant relatives. They represent the sister clade to haplorhines, which includes all monkeys and 
apes. Ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta) are among the most social species of lemur and phylogenetic 
comparisons among several lemur species have revealed that they are also the most sensitive to 
others’ perspectives (Maclean et al., 2013; Sandel, MacLean, & Hare, 2011) (but see Ruiz, Gomez, 
Roeder, & Byrne, 2008). As predicted by the social intelligence hypothesis, these findings raise the 
possibility that ring-tailed lemur social cognition has evolved convergently with monkeys and apes as 
a result of their more complex social environments (Jolly, 1966). However, their social cognition 
appears to be more limited than that of monkeys and apes. While lemurs preferentially steal food 
from competitors who cannot see them, unlike monkeys, they do not appear to take into account 
whether their competitor can hear them (Bray, Krupenye, & Hare, 2014; Santos et al., 2006). This 
minimal sensitivity suggests that lemurs may respond to overt cues of visual orientation but lack the 
richer integrated understanding of perspective exhibited by monkeys and apes. Importantly, since 
perspective-taking abilities do not appear to be shared across all primates, this body of work 
provides the strongest evidence that the theory of mind mechanisms documented in corvids, dogs, 
and monkeys and apes (which are at least superficially similar) have evolved convergently, multiple 
times. 
Dogs are another key species for social cognitive research. They provide a valuable tool for 
understanding cognitive evolution, especially when compared with their wild counterparts, wolves 
(Canis lupus), because changes in their traits are largely the result of a known domestication process 
involving artificial selection against aggression (Hare et al., 2002; Hare et al., 2005; Hare & 
Tomasello, 2005). Recent work suggests that dogs possess at least some basic perspective-taking 
abilities (Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2004; Call, Brauer, Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2003; Catala et al., 
2017; Kaminski et al., 2009; Kaminski, Pitsch, & Tomasello, 2013; MacLean, Krupenye, et al., 2014; 
Maginnity & Grace, 2014; Marshall-Pescini, Ceretta, & Prato-Previde, 2014; Udell, Dorey, & Wynne, 
2011; Virányi, Topál, Gacsi, Miklósi, & Csányi, 2004; Virányi, Topál, Miklósi, & Csányi, 2006). For 
example, they steal food when a human experimenter cannot see them, when searching for hidden 
food they preferentially follow points of a knowledgeable experimenter over an ignorant one, and 
when given an ambiguous fetch cue they selectively retrieve a toy that the experimenter can see 
over one that she cannot see. However, it remains unclear whether these abilities are also shared 
with wolves (and whether human socialization plays any role in their emergence or detectability). 
Future work must clarify the extent to which dog social cognition is analogous (or homologous) with 
primates and corvids, and whether shared traits are the result of domestication or deeper 
evolutionary events in carnivores, mammals, or amniotes (i.e., mammals, birds, and reptiles) more 
broadly.  
 
Novel Controls 
 The last decade has also seen some important innovations in experimental controls (Table 
2). Behavior-reading proponents have long argued that existing tasks cannot distinguish behavior-
reading from mind-reading because subjects have access to a number of behavioral cues that they 
can use to predict a partner’s behavior (C. Heyes, 2015). Although researchers have attempted to 
control for many such cues (see Hare, 2011 Table 1), a key advance of the last few years has been 
the development of paradigms in which subjects must make different inferences about an actor’s 
perspective despite the actor exhibiting identical behavior in key phases of all conditions (e.g., 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Luo, 2011; Luo & Baillargeon, 2007; Tomasello & Haberl, 
2003). For example, MacLean and Hare (2012) presented chimpanzees and bonobos with situations 
in which a human experimenter either had or had not seen an object visible to the subject. The 
experimenter then oriented toward the object, expressed surprise, and vocalized emotively. 
Subjects were significantly more likely to search for an alternative target of the experimenter’s 
attention when he had previously seen the object than when it was novel to him (see also Drayton & 
Santos, 2017 for similar work with rhesus macaques). That is, primates tracked the experimenter’s 
attention and responded differently, and appropriately, to the same behavior from the experimenter 
at the time of test, depending on whether the experimenter had previously attended to the object 
or not.  
Another common alternative explanation for theory of mind findings is that subjects may 
attend to an actor’s ‘line of gaze’ and predict the actor’s behavior according to the relevant 
geometric relationships—without actually representing those relationships as seeing (Povinelli & 
Vonk, 2004). Previous work, for example, showed that chimpanzees gesture more when a human 
with food has a ‘direct line of gaze’ to them (i.e., when he is facing them) than when he does not 
(Gómez, 1996; Hostetter et al., 2001; Kaminski et al., 2004; Leavens et al., 2004; Liebal et al., 2004; 
Povinelli & Eddy, 1996b; Povinelli et al., 2003; Tomasello et al., 1994). To dissociate ‘line of gaze’ 
from seeing, Lurz, Krachun, Mahovetz, Wilson, and Hopkins (2018) adjusted the task so that in some 
conditions the experimenter faced away from the subject (i.e., there was no ‘line of gaze’) but could 
still see her through a mirror. As predicted by the mentalistic hypothesis, they found that 
chimpanzees gestured more in all conditions in which the experimenter could actually see them than 
in those conditions in which she could not, independent of whether the experimenter actually had a 
‘line of gaze’ to the subjects. This finding suggests that chimpanzees’ inferences are not based on 
simple geometric calculations about ‘line of gaze.’ 
Another critical control has been the implementation of tasks in which subjects do not see 
the competitor at all and thus are not offered any visual cues to base their choices on. For example, 
Schmelz, Call, and Tomasello (2011) challenged pairs of chimpanzees with a competitive game in 
which they took turns searching for hidden food. The subject watched as one piece of food was 
hidden under a board, producing a visible slant, and a second piece of food was hidden in a secret 
hole in the table. His competitor could not see any of the baiting and was also not visible to the 
subject. When subjects could choose first (as well as in nonsocial controls in which no competitor 
was present), chimpanzees preferentially selected the food under the slanted board. However, when 
they chose second and had to consider which option their competitor had likely already obtained, 
chimpanzees were significantly more likely to select the secret food option. Chimpanzees likely 
recognized that their partner would remain ignorant to the location of the secret food but would 
correctly infer that the slanted board was slanted because food was hidden beneath it. They may 
have also expected their competitor to act in the same way they would have acted if they were in 
their competitor’s circumstances (Schmelz, Call, & Tomasello, 2013). Critically, subjects made their 
attributions without any cues about their partner’s perspective.  
 Bugnyar, Reber, and Buckner (2016) performed a related experiment with ravens in which 
subjects could cache food while a peephole potentially permitting observation by a competitor was 
either open or closed. Ravens cached food significantly more when the peephole was closed than 
when it was open, even though a competitor could be heard behind the peephole in all conditions. 
Thus, ravens adjusted their behavior based only on an inference that a competitor possessed or 
lacked visual access to their caching efforts. These findings suggest that simple associative cues 
related to orientation and gaze behavior cannot explain animals’ success in theory of mind tasks. 
 The strongest test for mind-reading was proposed twenty years ago by C. Heyes (1998) and 
reaffirmed recently (C. Heyes, 2015). The goggles task was designed to investigate whether 
organisms can attribute mental states by projecting onto others a novel perceptual state that 
subjects had only recently experienced for the first time (C. Heyes, 1998; Povinelli & Vonk, 2003, 
2004). For example, subjects could wear one of two identical pairs of goggles that either permitted 
or precluded vision. If subjects then observed an experimenter wearing the same goggles and 
treated her as capable or incapable of seeing, depending on whether the subjects had experienced 
the goggles as see-through or opaque, this would be evidence that they had used their own self-
experience to infer the experimenter’s mental state. Karg, Schmelz, Call, and Tomasello (2015b) 
implemented this design in a competitive context in which chimpanzees could attempt to steal from 
a human experimenter by reaching into either of two compartments. Except for different colored 
rims, the lids of the compartments appeared to be identical from the subject’s perspective, but, 
from the perspective of the experimenter, one was actually see-through and the other opaque. In 
the training phase, the subjects first experienced the perceptual affordances of the lids (i.e., when 
raised, subjects could see a peanut through one but not the other). In the test phase, when facing a 
competitor, subjects then preferred to steal from the compartment with the opaque lid (successfully 
preventing the competitor from seeing their theft), but showed no preference in a nonsocial control. 
These findings are consistent with the possibility that chimpanzees used their own self-experience to 
correctly attribute perceptual access to their competitor (but see C. Heyes, 2014a for discussion of 
the relationship between occlusive materials, distal presentation, and behavior-reading versus 
mindreading; Senju et al., 2011). Taken together, this innovative body of experiments provides 
increasingly firm evidence that at least some primates and corvids can model what others see and 
know. 
 
Novel Techniques 
 The introduction of novel techniques to measure gaze duration and direction has also had a 
transformative impact on theory of mind research (Kano, Krupenye, Hirata, & Call, 2017) (Figure 2). 
Comparative psychologists have adapted methods originated by developmental psychologists to 
study the minds of preverbal infants (Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2016; Cannon & Woodward, 2012; 
Gergely, Knadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995; Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010; Onishi & Bailargeon, 2005; 
Southgate et al., 2007; Woodward, 1998). Many traditional methods for studying human theory of 
mind involve asking participants whether they can predict what an actor will do next (on the basis of 
a particular mental state) (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
For nonverbal populations, the solution for assessing predictions has been to develop elegant but 
elaborate paradigms. For example, chimpanzee chess is a competitive game in which subjects take 
turns searching for hidden food under several cups and, when the subject chooses second, she must 
consider which cup her competitor has likely already chosen (based, for instance, on where she 
knows her competitor saw food hidden) (Kaminski et al., 2008; Karg, Schmelz, Call, & Tomasello, 
2016; Schmelz et al., 2011, 2013). Despite their conceptual simplicity, verbal tasks as well as those 
like chimpanzee chess impose notable demands on ancillary mechanisms like memory and inhibitory 
control—making it unclear whether negative results stem from lack of social cognition or heightened 
task demands. Gaze-based methods, like anticipatory looking and violation-of-expectation 
(described in the section on beliefs), facilitate the study of social cognition under minimally 
demanding conditions by implicitly measuring participants’ predictions. They have upended the field 
of developmental psychology (Baillargeon et al., 2016; Baillargeon et al., 2010), and are increasingly 
shifting the empirical landscape in comparative psychology as well. These methods have already 
provided evidence that apes and monkeys can predict others’ actions on the basis of their goals and 
knowledge and that apes may even be able to do so on the basis of others’ beliefs (Drayton & 
Santos, 2014b, 2018; Kano & Call, 2014b; Krupenye et al., 2016; Marticorena et al., 2011; Martin & 
Santos, 2014; Myowa-Yamakoshi, Scola, & Hirata, 2012; Rochat et al., 2008). Eye-tracking methods 
have also identified species differences in propensity for eye-contact, gaze-following, and social 
attention, and have probed components of long-term memory (Hattori, Kano, & Tomonaga, 2010; 
Kano & Call, 2014a; Kano & Hirata, 2015; Kano, Hirata, & Call, 2015; Kano, Moore, et al., 2018; Kano, 
Shepherd, Hirata, & Call, 2018; Kano & Tomonaga, 2010). Despite these important advances, gaze-
based methods hold immense latent potential that we expect will continue to unlock new 
opportunities and approaches for the study of animal theory of mind.  
 At this moment, these methods are particularly important additionally because they are 
necessary to verify and build on foundational discoveries in the study of human and animal 
cognition. Anticipatory looking and violation-of-expectation phenomena have produced robust 
findings in a variety of domains, including social cognition, with diverse populations. For example, 
human adults show largely replicable and consistent performance on a variety of published gaze-
based false belief tasks (Kulke & Rakoczy, 2018; Kulke, von Duhn, Schneider, & Rakoczy, 2018; Low & 
Watts, 2013; Schuwerk, Priewasser, Sodian, & Perner, 2018; Senju et al., 2009), and our own 
unpublished task. Similarly, great apes exhibited consistent success in our first set of similar tasks, 
across two studies each involving two conditions (Krupenye et al., 2016), and they have continued to 
perform successfully in related unpublished follow-ups (see also Buttelmann et al., 2017). Monkeys 
have also performed consistently across the tasks in which they have been tested (Drayton & Santos, 
2017, 2018; Marticorena et al., 2011; Martin & Santos, 2014). In human children, however, although 
a great many gaze-based false belief tasks have provided positive evidence for infant theory of mind 
(e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2010; Barrett et al., 2013; Scott & Baillargeon, 2017), recent efforts to 
replicate some of these tasks have produced a mix of replications, partial replications, and 
nonreplications (Kulke & Rakoczy, 2018; Sabbagh & Paulus, 2018). In many cases, replication 
attempts have departed, to varying degrees, from the stimuli, study populations, and procedures 
specified in the original methodologies, making it difficult to identity the sources of variation in 
results and the robustness of individual paradigms in general (Baillargeon, Buttelmann, & Southgate, 
2018; Poulin-Dubois et al., 2018). Given the central importance of these findings to theories of 
cognition and development and the potential of these methods for novel discoveries, a key task 
moving forward will be determining the reliability of false belief findings in human infants and 
identifying factors that impact their emergence and detectability across paradigms. Across all 
populations, as we develop novel approaches and build on existing findings, it will be important to 
use diverse tasks to evaluate the convergence of evidence for theoretically-important discoveries. 
We also advocate the continued exchange of methodologies across human adult, infant, and animal 
psychology. 
 
Novel Settings 
 A good deal of early experimental work on animal social cognition—namely, third-party 
knowledge or social knowledge—was conducted with wild populations (D. L. Cheney & R. M. 
Seyfarth, 1990; Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). In contrast, most experimental work on theory of mind 
has been completed in captivity. The trade-off is that captive settings permit much more power over 
experimental conditions, allowing researchers to strictly control for alternative explanations and to 
collect data more easily, whereas field settings permit investigation of cognition in contexts in which 
animals reliably use these abilities naturally. For more than a decade, Santos and colleagues have 
developed fruitful theory of mind tasks for the free-ranging rhesus macaques of Cayo Santiago, in 
Puerto Rico (Drayton & Santos, 2014b, 2017, 2018; Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Marticorena et al., 
2011; Martin & Santos, 2014; Santos et al., 2006), and more recently Crockford and colleagues have 
implemented theory of mind experiments with chimpanzees in the Budongo forest of Uganda 
(Crockford et al., 2012; Crockford et al., 2017). Both lines are yielding important insights. Further 
efforts to investigate theory of mind in the wild will help clarify its function, including both the 
proximate and ultimate benefits accrued from its use in natural contexts (Ashton, Ridley, Edwards, & 
Thornton, 2018).  
 
Future Directions 
 We advocate the pursuit of several important empirical approaches and methodological 
directions—relating to and extending advances in species, controls, techniques, and settings but 
organized around the four levels of analysis of behavior that were proposed by Tinbergen (1963). 
Only by investigating proximate (mechanism and ontogeny) and ultimate (phylogeny and function) 
causes can we fully understand the nature and origin of behavior. Clarification of the mechanisms 
underlying animal theory of mind requires continued efforts to develop innovative empirical 
approaches with stronger controls and which exploit novel methodological opportunities, like those 
offered by gaze-based paradigms. It will also be important to better understand the cognitive 
architecture of theory of mind. This involves delineating its constituent social (e.g., intention-
attribution, belief sensitivity) and nonsocial (e.g., inhibitory control, memory, self-awareness, 
metacognition, and future-oriented cognition) cognitive mechanisms, their representational 
underpinnings, and their relationship to one another. Large cognitive batteries will help clarify the 
extent to which individual differences in cognitive mechanisms can be identified and related to one 
another, and whether these skills and relationships vary across taxa. Experiments can also more 
directly assess the contribution of particular mechanisms to theory of mind by testing, for example, 
whether taxing a potential constituent mechanism like inhibitory control reduces performance on 
theory of mind tasks (e.g., Powell & Carey, 2017).   
 Cognitive tests and batteries administered at different time-points in an animal’s life will 
also be critical as these will clarify the ontogeny of social cognition. Cognitive development remains 
little explored in nonhumans but is also of high importance. Heterochronic shifts in developmental 
patterns may contribute substantially to species differences in adult cognition (Hare et al., 2012; 
Krupenye, MacLean, et al., 2017; Wobber, Wrangham, & Hare, 2010). Understanding how theory of 
mind is built during development is also critical for clarifying its underlying mechanisms and their 
relationship to one another. Recently, some effort has been made to investigate the ontogenetic 
origins of several types of cognition in nonhuman animals (Krupenye & Hare, 2018; Rosati & Hare, 
2012; Wobber, Herrmann, Hare, Wrangham, & Tomasello, 2014; Wobber, Wrangham, et al., 2010), 
but the developmental origins of theory of mind remain largely unexplored in other species 
(Tomasello et al., 2001).  
Turning to ultimate causes and in particular phylogeny, it is critical to continue to improve 
the coverage of species tested in social cognitive tasks, in order to identify cases of continuity as well 
as convergence. These efforts will require controlled experiments to determine whether superficially 
similar abilities are actually underpinned by common neural and psychological mechanisms. Broad 
phylogenetic analyses, as well as targeted comparisons between key sister taxa (e.g., dogs and 
wolves), will be important for understanding how social cognition evolved across taxa (Hare et al., 
2012; MacLean, Hare, et al., 2014; MacLean et al., 2012). These comparisons should target a range 
of species that face varying degrees and varieties of social and ecological challenges, including 
minimally social species, to determine the phylogenetic origins of social cognition and whether it can 
arise only in the presence of selective pressures from the social environment.   
Inferences about the function of theory of mind are implicit in task designs, since tasks are 
often engineered around contexts in which cognition is believed to confer benefits in the wild (e.g., 
deception and social competition). We would additionally benefit from more targeted investigations 
of both the proximate (immediate: e.g., sneaky copulations, escaping aggression) and ultimate 
(fitness: e.g., enhanced reproductive success, offspring survival) benefits of theory of mind within-
species in captive and wild settings. These efforts will elucidate the evolutionary processes that 
drove social cognitive evolution across species (Humphrey, 1976). Together, these four empirical 
approaches will permit a holistic understanding of the nature and origin of theory of mind in humans 
and other taxa. 
 
Conclusion 
 The study of theory of mind has grown dramatically in the last four decades, and so has the 
importance of research with non-human animals. This work provides unique insights into cognitive 
mechanisms—including the role of language, culture, and executive function in theory of mind—and 
into evolution—including the evolutionary history of theory of mind and the selective pressures that 
drove its evolution across species. Research has already made huge strides in identifying theory of 
mind capacities in nonhuman animals from corvids to primates to dogs. Recent advances in studying 
cognitive mechanisms have further blurred the lines between humans and non-humans, raising the 
possibility that some of the richest theory of mind abilities, such as understanding of subjective 
desires and false beliefs, may not be the exclusive province of our species. Distant relatives of 
humans, Eurasian jays, show sensitivity to others’ desires, even when they conflict with the subject’s 
own. Our closest relatives, the great apes, show sensitivity to perspectives that differ from their 
own, responding appropriately to others’ false beliefs. Continued investigation will be essential to 
clarify the extent to which the cognitive mechanisms possessed by humans are truly shared across 
taxa, and whether these common mechanisms reflect shared ancestry or evolutionary convergence.  
Work exploring the motivations involved in theory of mind has revealed that at least some 
species appear capable of using their social cognitive skills flexibly across cooperative, competitive, 
and neutral contexts. Consideration of motivations will be crucial for future species comparisons, for 
investigation of the precursors of shared intentionality in nonhumans, and for the development of 
social cognitive tasks not centered around food. Finally, new methods and empirical approaches—
including novel species, novel controls, novel techniques, and novel settings—have pushed the 
boundaries of our understanding of theory of mind in animals. Research on lemurs and dogs sheds 
light on the evolutionary origins of theory of mind; new controls constrain the possible explanations 
for animals’ success in theory of mind tasks, strongly suggesting that apes and corvids can at least 
represent what others can see; burgeoning techniques like eye-tracking and looking time analyses 
provide a powerful new window into animals’ minds; and exploration of theory of mind in the wild 
provides insights into its natural ecology and function. These advances, in concert with Tinbergen’s 
four levels of analysis, will ensure sustained progress in our effort to understand the nature and 
origin of theory of mind in humans and other species. 
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Table 1. Interpretation of apes’ successful performance in false belief tests. We outline hypotheses, 
their explanations, and how they have or have not been controlled for. In the conclusion column, ‘X’ 
denotes hypotheses that have been controlled for whereas ‘?’ denotes hypotheses that remain 
potential explanations for apes’ successful performance.  
Hypothesis Explanation Control Conclusion 
Perceptual 
Subjects looked to the first or 
last location the goal object 
inhabited (Southgate et al., 
2007)  
In the FB1 condition of Krupenye 
et al. (2016), the target location of 
the actor's false belief was the last 
location the object inhabited 
whereas in the FB2 condition it 
was the first. Thus, neither rule 
can explain correct performance 
across conditions 
X 
Perceptual 
Subjects looked to the last 
location the actor attended 
(Southgate et al., 2007) 
In the FB1 condition of Experiment 
2 of Krupenye et al. (2016), after 
the actor watched the object 
being moved to its final location, 
the actor's attention was directed 
to the incorrect location, before 
the actor left the scene  
X 
Attention 
Subjects did not notice the 
removal of the goal object after 
the actor's departure from the 
scene (C. Heyes, 2014a) 
Eye-tracking analyses showed that 
apes closely tracked all key events, 
including removal of the object 
(Krupenye et al., 2016) 
X 
Submentalizing 
Subjects were submentalizing--
i.e., anticipating on the basis of 
domain-general cueing effects 
(C. Heyes, 2017) 
In an inanimate control suggested 
by C. Heyes (2017), involving 
stimuli matched for perceptual 
features but with minimized 
agentic characteristics, apes 
attended closely but made 
markedly fewer looks to the target 
and distractor locations than in 
the original test and did not show 
a significant pattern of looking to 
the target location (Kano, 
Krupenye, Hirata, Call, et al., 2017; 
Krupenye, Kano, et al., 2017) 
X 
Ignorance Subjects attributed ignorance Apes did not expect the actor to X 
to the actor rather than a false 
belief (Baillargeon et al., 2010) 
err or to exhibit uncertainty; they 
specifically anticipated that the 
actor would search for the object 
where he falsely believed it to be 
Behavior Rule 
During the course of their lives, 
subjects had learned that 
"agents tend to search for 
things where they last saw 
them" (Perner & Ruffman, 
2005) 
Stimuli involved a constellation of 
novel features to minimize the 
possibility that learned behavior 
rules could be applied. However, 
all change-of-location tasks, in 
which an actor has a false belief 
that an object is located where he 
last saw it, are open to this 
interpretation 
? 
Minimalist 
Account 
Subjects attributed to the actor 
a belief-like state, noting that 
the actor "encountered" the 
goal object in a particular 
location and "registered" it 
there, without fully 
representing that the actor 
believed that the object was in 
that location (Apperly & 
Butterfill, 2009; Butterfill & 
Apperly, 2013) 
The minimalist account predicts 
success in change-of-location false 
belief tasks because, in those 
tasks, the location where an actor 
falsely believes an object to be 
located is also the last location 
where the actor “registered” that 
object. However, minimal theory 
of mind does not permit its 
bearers to attribute false beliefs 
about identity and thus predicts 
failure in change-of-identity tasks. 
This prediction remains untested. 
? 
Mentalist 
Account 
Subjects attributed to the actor 
a belief that the object was 
located in the location where 
the actor last saw it, even 
though subjects knew that it 
was no longer there 
The mentalist account predicts 
success in both change-of-location 
and change-of-identity false belief 
tasks. The latter part of this 
prediction remains untested. 
? 
 
Table 2. Recent novel controls for lower level explanations of animal theory of mind tasks. 
Hypothesis Control Reference 
Animals are responding 
to behavioral cues that 
differ between conditions 
At the time of test, experimenters provide identical 
cues between conditions 
(Drayton 
& Santos, 
2017; 
MacLean 
& Hare, 
2012) 
Animals predict behavior 
by identifying which 
features of the 
environment are within 
an actor's geometric 'line 
of gaze' 
Mirrors are used to dissociate an experimenter's 'line 
of gaze' from what she can see (i.e., in some 
conditions, an experimenter can see something via a 
mirror, even though she does not have a direct 'line of 
gaze') 
(Lurz et 
al., 2018) 
Subjects never see the actor/competitor and 
therefore do not have access to his 'line of gaze' 
(Bugnyar 
et al., 
2016; 
Schmelz 
et al., 
2011, 
2013) 
Animals can read 
behavior but not minds 
Subjects receive perceptual experience of novel 
barriers (i.e., one is opaque and the other see-
through, even though both look the same). Subjects 
then face a task in which they can succeed by 
attributing the same perceptual access to an actor 
(Karg et 
al., 
2015b) 
Other important controls throughout the years 
(Table 1 
of Hare, 
2011) 
 
